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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO

Supreme Court
Docket No. 35138

RALPH J. HENDERSON, an individual,
Appellant,
vs.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
HENDERSON INVESTMENT
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an Idaho
Limited Liability Company, ROGER
E. HENDERSON, an individual, and
LISA A. HENDERSON, an individual,
Respondents.

Appellant, Ralph J. Henderson, by and through his attorney of record, Norman G. Reece,
P.C., hereby submits the following Appellant's Reply Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case was set forth fully in Appellant's initial brief and will not be
repeated here. Therefore, the nature of the case, course of proceedings, and statement of facts as set
forth in Appellant's Brief are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the trial court err in awarding Respondents their attorney fees uuder the Operating
Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C.?
LEGAL ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

As noted in Appellant's Brief, the award of attorney fees in this case is discretionary and
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547,549, 181 P.3d 473,475
(2008).

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEY FEES.

Although the court correctly denied Respondents their attorney fees uuder Idaho Code (LC.)
§ 12-120(3) and§ 12-121, the court erred in awarding attorney fees to the Respondents uuder the

terms of a certain provision of the Operating Agreement for Henderson Investment Properties, L.L.C.
("HIP Operating Agreement"). The provision at issue provides as follows:
In any action or proceeding brought to enforce any provision of this
Agreement, or where any provision is validly asserted as a defense,
the successful party is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees
in addition to any other available remedy.
HIP Operating Agreement at 9 ,r XIV(G), R. p. 62.
Thus, by its plain terms, this provision applies only if (1) the litigation seeks to enforce a
provision of the HIP Operating Agreement, or (2) a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement is
validly asserted as a defense thereto.
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This case was not one where the Appellant sought to enforce any provision of the HIP
Operating Agreement, nor where the Respondents validly asserted any provision of the HIP
Operating Agreement as a defense. Therefore, ,i XIV(G) of the HIP Operating Agreement for
attorney fees does not apply, and the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees under that
provision.
A. The Judicial Dissolution Action Was Not Brought
to Enforce Any Provision of the HIP Operating Agreement.
Respondents argue that, since the HIP Operating Agreement was "relevant" to this case, the
attorney fee provision found in ,i XIV(G) applies. Respondents' Brief, dated December 10, 2008
("Respondents' Brief') at 4-5.
Respondents' argument misses the point. Obviously, it is impossible to bring an action for
judicial dissolution under LC.§ 53-643 without a limited liability company governed by an operating
agreement. In this case, but for the parties' business relationship as defined by the HIP Operating
Agreement, Ralph would not have had grounds for the judicial dissolution. Moreover, the mere fact
that the HIP Operating Agreement gave rise to the lawsuit does not mean the lawsuit was designed
to enforce a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. Several recent cases from the Idaho
Supreme Court support this position.
In Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166 (2007), the parties had signed a stock
purchase agreement, and plaintiff subsequently filed suit, alleging various tort and contract theories
ofliability stemming from that transaction. Mannas, 143 Idaho at 930, 155 P.3d at 1169. The stock
purchase agreement contained a provision for an attorney fee award to the prevailing party if a
lawsuit were brought to enforce the terms of the stock purchase agreement. Mannas, 143 Idaho at
937, 155 P.3d at 1176. The Supreme Court held that attorney fees were not available under that
provision of the stock purchase agreement, because neither party sought to enforce the stock
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purchase agreement. Mannas, 143 Idaho at 937, 155 P.3d at 1176.
In Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 122, 192 P.3d 1036 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court
considered an attorney fee provision similar to the one at issue in this case. In Chavez, a property
settlement agreement stemming from a divorce between the parties contained a provision for an
award of attorney fees if either party instituted litigation seeking to enforce the property settlement
agreement. Chavez, 146 Idaho at 216, 192 P .3d at I 040. The Chavez case was a quiet title action,
and the Idaho Supreme Court held that although the action was based on the property settlement
agreement, it did not seek to enforce the property settlement agreement, and thus denied attorney
fees based on the attorney fee provision of the property settlement agreement. Chavez, 146 Idaho
at 225, 192 P.3d at 1049.
In Lane Ranch Partnership v. City ofSun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 166 P.3d 374 (2007), the
court likewise denied attorney fees requested under the terms of an agreement between the parties.
In Lane, the Lane Ranch Partnership entered into an annexation agreement with the City of Sun
Valley. Lane RanchPartnership, 144 Idaho at 586-87, 166 P.3dat376-77. After Sun Valley denied
the partnership's zoning applications, the partnership sued Sun Valley. Lane Ranch Partnership,
144 Idaho at 587, 166 P.3d at 377. At issue was the effect of the terms of the annexation agreement
on the zoning applications. Lane Ranch Partnership, 144 Idaho at 589-90, I 66 P.3d at 379-80. The
Idaho Supreme Court held that, since the partnership was not seeking specific enforcement of the
annexation agreement, attorney fees were not available under a provision of the agreement which
allowed for attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action brought under the agreement. Lane
Ranch Partnership, 144 Idaho at 591-92, 166 P.3d at 381-82.
Finally, Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 170 P.3d 393 (2007), similarly denied a request for
attorney fees based on a contract provision, since the terms of the provision did not apply to the
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context of the lawsuit. The lawsuit in Cannon arose out of a contract containing a provision for an
award of attorney fees against the defaulting party if the lawsuit was brought to enforce the contract.

Cannon, 144 Idaho at 730, 732, 170 P.3d at 395,397. The Idaho Supreme Court held the attorney
fee provision did not apply because neither party had been adjudicated to be in default. Cannon, 144
Idaho at 732, 170 P.3d.at 397.
Thus, as illustrated by the Mannos, Chavez, Lane Ranch, and Cannon cases, the mere
existence of an agreement with an attorney fee provision does automatically entitle the prevailing
party to an award of attorney fees. The precise terms of the attorney fee provision must be met.
Moreover, in each of these cases, the fact that such an agreement gave rise to the litigation did not
automatically invoke application of the provision for an attorney fee award; indeed, the request was
denied because the precise terms of the provision did not apply to the case at issue. Thus, where the
case was not one for enforcement of a contract term, a provision for attorney fees in enforcement
actions was held not to apply.
Likewise, in this case, while Ralph's lawsuits may have had their genesis in the HIP
Operating Agreement, that fact alone does not mean the attorney fee provision of,i XIV(G) applies.
Respondents have failed to show that this litigation sought to enforce any provision of the HIP
Operating Agreement. Therefore, the court erred in awarding attorney fees under ,i XIV(G).
The trial court abused its discretion in holding that Ralph was seeking to enforce several
provisions of the HIP Operating Agreement by bringing the action for judicial dissolution. First,
since Ralph was seeking judicial dissolution of HIP, the last thing his lawsuit would seek is
enforcement of any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement, because that would result in
continuing the existence of HIP, rather than dissolving HIP. Second, the Respondents' argument that
Ralph tried to enforce ,i XIV(B) of the HIP Operating Agreement is disingenuous as well. The sole
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relevance of,r XIV(B) of the HIP Operating Agreement was in Ralph's attempt to show irreparable
harm, an element of judicial dissolution, by that provision. He was not seeking to "enforce" that
provision. Paragraph XIV(B) of the HIP Operating Agreement provided:
B. Specific Performance. The parties to this Agreement agree that
irreparable damage would occur if any of the provisions of this
Agreement were not performed in accordance with its specific terms
or were otherwise breached. The parties agree that they are entitled
to an injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of this Agreement
and to specifically enforce the terms and provisions in any United
States court or any state having jurisdiction, in addition to any other
remedy to which they are entitled at law or in equity.
HIP Operating Agreement at 9 ,r XIV(B), R. 62.
Clearly, if,r XIV(B) were used, for example, in an action for injunctive relief, then Ralph
would have been seeking to enforce this provision. Indeed, that is the intent of this provision in an
enforcement context. But as indicated earlier, Ralph's sole purpose in using ,r XIV(B) was to show
an element of his action for judicial dissolution - irreparable harm. Therefore, the court abused its
discretion in holding that this, along with other provisions of the HIP Operating Agreement, were
sought to be enforced by Ralph in bringing his judicial dissolution action.
B. The Statutory Dissociation Action Was Not Brought
to Enforce Any Provision of the HIP Operating Agreement.
The Respondents argue that, since the attorney fee provision allows an attorney fee award
in the judicial dissolution action, attorney fees should also be awarded in the statutory dissociation
action, since the two were essentially the same. Respondents' Brief at 8-9. Respondents' argument
attempts to bootstrap an award of attorney fees based on the dissolution action without showing the
dissociation action was brought to enforce a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. This is a
critical distinction, because that is what the plain language of the provision requires - an action to

enforce a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement.
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Moreover, this distinction is most critical in the dissociation action, because of the plain
terms of the statute upon which the action was based-LC. § 53-64l(e). Under LC. § 53-64l(e), if
a proceeding for dissolution is commenced against a member of a limited liability company and has
not been dismissed within 120 days, the member ceases to be a member, unless otherwise provided
by the operating agreement. Therefore, by the very terms of the statute, an action brought under LC.
§ 53-64l(e) cannot be an action to enforce a provision of an operating agreement. Simply put, the
statute cannot apply if an operating agreement contains a provision to the contrary. Section 53641 (e) comes into play when there is no such provision in the operating agreement. Consequently,
a lawsuit under§ 53-64l(e) cannot be an action to enforce a term of an operating agreement. Thus,
there is no way in which Ralph's dissociation action under LC. § 53-64l(e) was brought to enforce
a provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. The fact that the HIP Operating Agreement contained
nothing similar to the provisions of that statute precludes enforcement of an HIP Operating
Agreement provision as grounds for such a lawsuit. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion
in awarding attorney fees as to the dissociation action.

III.
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
THEIR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

For the same reasons as explained above, no attorney fees should be awarded to the
Respondents on appeal. Neither the judicial dissolution nor statutory dissociation action sought to
enforce any provision of the HIP Operating Agreement. Therefore, the attorney fee provision of,r
XIV(G) does not allow an award of attorney fees to the Respondents on appeal. Chavez, 146 Idaho
at 225, 192 P.3d at 1049 (denying award of attorney fees on appeal where provision for attorney fee
award in agreement at issue allowed such an award for breach of agreement, and appeal was from
dismissal of an action not asserting breach of agreement).
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furthermore, Respondents are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal, because they failed to
indicate their claim as an additional issue on appeal under "Issue Presented on Appeal" as required
by Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5).
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the district court in awarding attorney fees to the
Respondents. The trial court abused its discretion by applying the attorney fee provision of the HIP
Operating Agreement where it clearly did not apply. The trial court did not exercise reason when
it ruled the provision applied to the case at bar. Neither case was instituted to enforce any provision
ofthe HIP Operating Agreement. This was a necessary and critical condition precedentto any award
of attorney fees at trial or on appeal. The trial court's decision to award attorney fees was thus in
error and should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 2009.
NORMAN G. REECE, P.C.

By_~-------~-+-----Norman G. Reece, Jr., of the F rm, Attorney
for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE;
. I hereby certify that on this 8th day of January, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregomg APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by depositing the same in the United States mail, at
Pocatello, postage pre-paid, in an envelope addressed to:

Ron Kerl
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

Norman G. Reece, Jr.
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